L'ILLYRIE MÉRIDIONALE ET L'ÉPIRE DANS L'ANTIQUITÉ

III

Actes du IIIe colloque international de Chantilly (16-19 Octobre 1996) réunis par Pierre Cabanes

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OCTAVIAN’S CAMPAIGNS (35-33 BC)
IN SOUTHERN ILLYRICUM

An Evaluation of Octavian’s Illyrian Wars

Octavian’s military campaigns in Illyricum may be considered as perhaps a decisive phase in the conquest of the future provinces of Pannonia and Dalmatia, decisive not so much in the sense of conquering extensive new territories, such as the Pannonian hinterland of the future province of Dalmatia, i.e. the regions of the Andizetes, Breuci, Daesitiae, Macezii, Diftones, and other peoples settled in present-day Croatia and Bosnia, but rather in the sense of a continuation of Caesar’s frontier policy in Cisalpine Gaul, and -- unlike Caesar’s policy in Illyricum in the sense of the first systematic conquest of the area. Both, consolidation of the frontier of Cisalpine Gaul, as well as strengthening the Roman positions in Illyricum, were indispensable for the protection of northern Italy. Important and major Pannonian peoples, as well as Illyrian peoples of the interior, had most probably not been directly attacked and conquered at that time, despite the analyses of Swoboda and Vulić, who ascribed to Octavian the military conquest of much of present-day Bosnia. Yet it would be strange if Appian, who had used Augustus’ Memoirs and listed thirty peoples involved in these campaigns, would have omitted to mention the names of these significant Pannonian and Illyrian peoples, and even his Daesitae are highly problematic. It is far from certain whether the name may be considered as corrupted and actually concealing the name of the Daesitiae, as had already been emended by Schweighäuser in his 1785 edition of Appian and widely accepted, or whether the Daesii should rather be considered yet another, elsewhere unattested people, mentioned only by Appian.

Thus the conclusions of Swoboda and Vulić, as well as all other scholars who postulated extensive military campaigns, were to some extent rightly questioned by Syme, and especially Schmittmacher, their doubts having been widely accepted by scholars who subsequently dealt with the history of these wars. Rather, the significance of Octavian’s campaigns lay in the fact that he reconquered territories lost during the civil wars, restored Roman authority


2 - Ph.-G. Freher, Der hellenistische Osten und das Illyricum unter Caesar (Palingenesia 42), Stuttgart 1993; M. Šašel Kos, Zagorovska podoba prastara med Avileja, Indrenom in Simonjem pri Klasnu Dominu in Herofjeanu. A Historical Outline of the Region between Aquileia, the Adriatic, and Simonium in Cassio Dio and Herodotus, Ljubljana 1986, 102-107, with earlier citations.

3 - E. Swoboda, Octavian und Illyricum (Panegra 1), Wien 1932.


Figure 1 – Map of northern Illyria.
in some of the neighbouring areas, and subdued some of the Pannonian territory in the direction of Moesia and Macedonia, very likely with the intention of linking, some time in the future, the Roman northwestern conquests to the territory conquered from Macedonia. However, in his latest study, Fitz still believed – probably wrongly – that ultimately the “subjugation” of the Pannonian regions did not mean their annexation to the province of Illyricum. 6

According to Dio (50.24.4), Octavian even claimed before the battle at Actium that his army had reached the Danube, which may well be true.

The Motives

In his basic study of Octavian’s wars in Illyricum, Schmittner emphasized on the one hand the importance that should be ascribed to the reasons and motives for these wars as given by the ancient sources, mainly Appian and Cassius Dio, and on the other, the significance of these wars for Octavian’s struggle for supreme power. He is one of the rare scholars who refused to recognize any ultimate motives behind the wars apart from those given by the two Greek historians. He thus acknowledged as real reasons only those deduced from Octavian’s claim, noted by Appian, that he reconquered rebellious peoples and simultaneously conquered some that had hitherto not yet been subdued, as well as his announced Dacian campaign, referred to only by Appian and not by Dio, and used mainly in terms of propaganda. As one of Octavian’s most important reasons, however, Schmittner accepted Dio’s claim that Octavian wanted to maintain his army at the cost of a foreign country and exercise it outside Italy. This last motive is well supported by the statement in Velleius Paterculus (II 78.2), that Octavian had already begun to train his army in “Illyricum and Dalmatia” in 39 BC (the date is deduced from the context). The motive is not mentioned by Appian, i.e. it did not appear in Augustus’ Memoirs, 7 and must reflect a source slightly hostile to Octavian, which Dio at least partly used for his Augustan narrative. 8 It was further stressed by Appian that Octavian’s military activity, when compared to Antony’s lack of success and postulated inactivity, would stand out in a sharp light (cf. Plut., Ant. 55.1), especially Octavian’s recovery of the military standards lost by Gabinius in his war against the Delmatae, which meant the restoration of Roman honour and was specifically mentioned on the Monumentum Ancyanum (29.1: Sigur militaria complura per alios d[am] es am[issar] devic[u]s ho] stibus re[cip] et Hispa[nia et (Gal]lia et a Dalmati[es/c[ina pare H] de]]. Schmittner saw in Octavian’s wars mainly large-scale multi-dimensional military manoeuvres, in the course of which a huge military force was deployed, and which could be stopped -- if necessary -- at any moment. 9 He would not admit any other explanation of motives, neither that Octavian would have wanted to secure the valley of the Save River to prevent a possible counterattack by Antony, 10 nor that he would have wanted to use Illyricum as a military base for a future encounter with Antony, as had already been postulated by Patsh, 11 and later argued by Mirković. 12 Gruen’s opinion is also too one-sided when he claims that Octavian needed primarily to enhance his military reputation to match that of Antony, personally taking part in battles and even suffering injuries. 13 It seems to me no less important to consider that both, the vicinity of Italy and of Antony’s territories, undoubtedly played an additional, and not inconspicuous, role in Octavian’s choice of enemy.

Mommersen’s explanation of Octavian’s wars as the first phase of great offensive plans to extend the northern and northeastern frontiers of the Roman state as far as the Rhine and the Danube seemed rather to have been Augustus’ projection of the subsequent achievements of his

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8 - Cf. Schmittner (n. 5), 195-198; Szejel Kos (n. 2), 142-144;
10 - Sowodba (n. 3), 44 ff.
13 - Gruen, Between Republic (n. 5), 401; cf. idem, CAH (n. 5), p. 172.
reign back to the years 35-33 BC. Although Schmitthenner ascribed great importance to the wars as a means of Octavian's self-propaganda in terms of his antagonism with Antony, which has already been pointed out by Dobias, he would not admit the possibility—in my opinion perhaps inconsistently—that Octavian could have deliberately chosen Illyricum as the scene of the military actions of his army in order to concentrate discreetly at least part of it as near Antony's dominion as possible. This has been shown by the analyses of Mirkovic.

Scodra

As is known, the dividing line between the spheres of influence of the two triumvirs, decided at Brundisium, ran somewhat illogically across southern Illyricum at Scodra north of the Drilon, mentioned expressly by Appian (Bell. civ. V 65:274: ὁ δὲ Καίσαρ καὶ ὁ Ἀντώνιος τὴν Ῥωμαίον εὐθὺς ἐκείνην ἐκέφερον ἐπισκόπην, ὥστε τὴν Ἰλλυρίαν, ἐν μονοτομῆς Ἰωνίου μακεδόνα καταλατρύνετο ἐπειδή...; cf. also Dio, 48.28.4; Plut., Ant. 30.6; Liv., Epit. 127.5). It remained unexplained why this demarcation line had not coincided with the northwestern border of the province of Macedonia. Scodra was probably chosen by way of having been the capital—or one of the main fortresses—of the last Illyrian king Genthius, deposed after the last Illyrian War successfully won by the Romans in 167 BC. As a former capital of a relatively powerful kingdom, it had enjoyed prominence in the 2nd century BC, and as a royal residence it was not unknown to the Romans. It cannot thus be claimed to have been given unprecedented prominence in having been singled out by the pact of Brundisium as a boundary town; it was merely given renewed prominence. Its choice may be explained by the fact that it roughly delimited the civilized southern part of the former Illyrian kingdom from its less developed northern areas. By having imposed Scodra as a border town, Antony's partisans—notably Asinius Pollio, while Macean was negotiating for Octavian—gained the Lissus area for their general, thus obtaining possession of all three important southern Illyrian harbours of Apollonia, Durrhachium, and Lissus. These might prove some time in future of vital strategic importance as army bases and, especially as military supply bases. Consequently it may be hypothesized that the choice itself of Scodra as a border town between the triumvirs (which, of course, be considered haphazard), as opposed to a more logical border between the provinces of Macedonia and Illyricum, marked a small—but obviously not negligible—strategic advantage of Antony's party over that of Octavian.

How to explain the background of the contest between the triumvirs, and their more or less unpronounced real motives behind appearances, is a matter of literary criticism and objective interpretation of data contained in historians of the period, combined with other extant evidence, but it cannot be denied that at least Appian makes it clear that, as early as Perusia and Brundisium, Octavian foresaw the eventual conflict with Antony and acted entirely to his own advantage, with no intention of preventing it. A possible military conflict between the triumvirs was undoubtedly not excluded also by Asinius Pollio; that he knew the strategic situation in Illyria well enough is indirectly proven by his subsequent campaign against the Parthini in 39 BC, within the dominion assigned to Antony. According to Pelling, Illyricum would not have been strategically valuable for Octavian if it came to war with Antony, unless it could be fully conquered; this, however, could not be achieved quickly. The dividing line at Scodra outlined by R. Syme, Pollio, Salonius and Salonae, The Classical Quarterly 31, 1937, 39-48.

18 - App., Bell. civ. V 75:320, who mentions an expedition sent by Antony against the Parthini and Daradanius Αἰτιατούς τὸν μὲ τὴν ἐποίησαν ἐπιτροπὴν ὑπὲρ ὑπερήφανος ἐπισκεφτος, τὸν Ἐμπυρίαν ἐποίησαν, Παρθηνώνας ἐποίησαν, τὸν Ἁρηύντην ἐποίησαν, τὸν Ἁρηύντην ἐποίησαν, τὸν Ἡρώδην ἐποίησαν, τὸν Ἡρώδην ἐποίησαν, τὸν Ἡρώδην ἐποίησαν, τὸν Ἡρώδην ἐποίησαν, τὸν Ἡρώδην ἐποίησαν, τὸν Ἡρώδην ἐποίησαν, τὸν Ἡρώδην ἐποίησαν, τὸν Ἡρώδην ἐποίησαν, τὸν Ἡρώδην ἐποίησαν, τὸν Ἡρώδην ἐποίησαν, τὸν Ἡρώδην ἐποίησαν, τὸν Ἡρώδην ἐποίησαν. See also Vell. Pat. 11, 121, who mentions a campaign in Illyricum (Dalmatica), conducted at around the same date by Octavian. There is hardly any doubt that this military expedition against the Parthini should be considered identical with Pollio's (Dio, 48:11,17: ἐπειδή... ἐν Ἐλληνων: τοις Ἐλληνων: Τοις τοις Ἐλληνων: Δαμαστη, τοις τοις Ἐλληνων: Εὐρωπαίοις, τοις, τοις Ἐλληνων: Εὐρωπαίοις, τοις τοις Ἐλληνων: Εὐρωπαίοις, τοις τοις Ἐλληνων: Εὐρωπαίοις, τοις τοις Ἐλληνων: Εὐρωπαίοις, τοις τοις Ἐλληνων: Εὐρωπαίοις, τοις τοις Ἐλληνων: Εὐρωπαίοις, τοις τοις Ἐλληνων: Εὐρωπαίοις, τοις τοις Ἐλληνων: Εὐρωπαίοις, τοις τοις Ἐλληνων: Εὐρωπαίοις, τοις τοις Ἐλληνων: Εὐρωπαίοις, τοις τοις Ἐλληνων: Εὐρωπαίοις, τοις τοις Ἐλληνων: Εὐρωπαίοις. However, Pollio's political position during those years is disputed; see Syme (n. 19), and Bosworth (n. 19); see also A. J. Woodman, Vellus Paterculus. The Caesarian and Augustan Narrative (2.41-93) (Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries 25), Cambridge 1983, 192-196, on Vell. ad loc., with further citations. In my opinion, Pollio's campaign and that of Octavian should be considered as two different military actions.
gives precisely a clue to this problem: there is no doubt that southern Illyria, with its three harbours, was highly relevant geopolitically in any conflict between the triumvirs, which would have been decided somewhere in the southern Balkans, or at least outside Italy, towards the East. It is thus plausible to assume that Octavian would have attempted to gain control of the area, and this is also directly confirmed by Appian’s list of conquered peoples and tribes, which included the Taulantii. Appian’s narrative also reveals that towards the very end of his Illyrian wars, Octavian concentrated his troops in the southernmost part of his dominion, which enabled him to make inroads into Antony’s territory.

The Importance Ascribed to Illyricum by Octavian

There is hardly any doubt that Octavian placed great importance on his aspiration to attain supreme power, and that all other reasons for his Illyrian wars were, to a large extent, subordinated to his attempts to attain it. Although the protection of economically important northern Italy may have been pressing, he was nonetheless reluctant to cooperate in 36 BC with Antony in a campaign against the Illyrians (App., Bel. civ. V 132.549), which he had announced in the autumn of the same year (ib. V 128.530), and in which Antony wished to participate. Octavian ostensibly left for Sicily with the intention of sailing to Africa (Dio 49.34.1), because he wanted to operate alone in Illyricum. Yet it is also clear that he was well aware that the situation in Illyricum was far from stable and that Roman territory near it and within it was in great (actual and potential) danger, especially since, after the battle at Philippi, the army had largely been evacuated from the Balkans. Octavian wanted to strengthen the eastern border region of northern Italy, across which the lapodes are known to have twice attacked Aquileia and Tergeste in the previous twenty years, and have defeated D. Brutus in 43 BC, seizing his military equipment and siege engines, when the latter attempted to reach Macedonia from Cisalpine Gaul. Equally, Octavian intended to protect the Caesarian colonies on the coast, Saloneae, Epidaurum, and Naronae, which were threatened by the Delmatae. Dio began his narrative of these wars by stating that they were an absolute military necessity, and listed the Salassi, Taurisci, Liburni, and lapodes as no longer paying tribute; some rebelled on the news that Octavian intended to leave for Africa (49.34.2).

So it does not seem consistent with the extant literary evidence to claim that the wars were not necessary because the northern frontier of Italy was not menaced at the time. Dio merely mentioned, after his account of the fall of Metulum, that the Pannonians (i.e. the Segestani), and only they, gave Octavian no grounds to invade them (49.36.1).

Schmitthenner is undoubtedly right in claiming that all previous campaigns in Illyricum only stopped an immediate danger and were never intended to conquer the Balkans systematically. In his opinion, the border line itself at Scodra, between Octavian’s and Antony’s dominions, testifies against systematic conquest, also in the case of Octavian’s wars in 35-33 BC. However, it is certainly tendentious to say that this demarcation line cut across Illyricum, since it merely split the southernmost Illyrian regions (those included within Macedonia), and the area between Scodra and Lissus, from the rest of the province of Illyricum. It would perhaps have been more logical to establish the dividing line at Lissus; however, this decision was a matter of power confrontation between the triumvirs, but it may still be correctly claimed that most of Illyricum was assigned to Octavian. The importance of the Illyrian wars cannot be measured by the fact that contemporaries did not mention them (but see Livy, Per. 131 and 132) – this is an argument e silentio which may be explained in several ways, all of them hypothetical. When, on the other hand, Octavian claimed that he had subdued all of Illyricum (App., Ilyr, 28), he was perfectly correct, since actually he had even extended the borders of the existing province. By using the name of Illyricum, he could not have used it anachronistically, and could not have projected in it the future conquests of Tiberius.

Octavian’s military campaigns extended over an enormous area, and it is hard to agree with Schmitthenner and Gruen that as military manoeuvres they were mainly a display of power that lacked systematic and strategically detailed plans, implying future conquests. Battles are reported to have taken place outside Illyricum against the Salassi and Carni – that there could be no question of possible “Illyrian” Salassi, has been sufficiently demonstrated. The Taurisci are mentioned as a hostile nation: part of it, living in the Nauporit and Emona areas, must have been included within Cisalpine Gaul, while the rest would have been partly more or less dependent on the Norican kingdom, and partly still independent, mainly as Octavian’s wars, the word Illyricum had had the meaning of the whole of the western Balkans. However, the originally small province grew along with the new conquests and attained its full size only after the end of the great Pannonian-Delmataean rebellion.

25 - Incorrect reasoning about the size of Illyricum in the pre-Tibetan period in Vulli, The Illyrian War (n. 4), who maintained that as early
the tribes living in lower Carniola, later known under the name of the Latobići. War was waged against the Iapodes and the Segestani and other Pannonians, as well as against the Delmatae and a large number of peoples and tribes living in the coastal regions of the future province of Dalmatia, mainly in its southern section down to Scodra, and even across the dividing line between Octavian’s and Antony’s dominions. Although Octavian participated personally in some of the campaigns, which were partly aimed at pacifying rebellious tribes and partly at conquering new territories, notably against the Iapodes, Segestani and Delmatae, a number of them were conducted solely by his commanders or in collaboration with them. These were Fufusus Geminius and the former freedman of Sextus Pompey, Menodorus, both mentioned only by Dio as having conducted operations in the campaign against Siscia (49, 38, 1-3), M. Valerius Messalla Corvinus (consul 31 BC, campaigns against the Iapodes, Pannonii, and Salassi). Two enigmatic commanders, Hiero (perhaps Ti. Claudius Nero?), and Lutus, mentioned by Appian, as well as M. Helvius (the subjugation of the Poseni), and one of Octavian’s best generals, T. Statilius Taurus (consul 37 BC together with Agrippa, the siege of Setovia, command in the Dalmatian part of Illyricum in 34-33 BC). Moreover, Octavian did not neglect to appear as imperator, advertising his intended campaigns against the Dacians, the Bastarnae (Illyr. 22.65 ff.) and Britain (Dio 49.38). According to Dio, preparations for a campaign in Britain brought him as far as Gallia in 34 BC, from where he had to return because of “an uprising of several recently pacified peoples”, i.e. peoples from Illyricum.

Peoples Involved in the Illyrian Wars

In the 16th chapter, Appian enumerated peoples and/or tribes which Octavian subdued in one campaign: these were the Oxyaei, Pertheanetae, Bathiatae, Taulantii, Cimbri, Cenambræ, Meromenni, and Pyrracii. With more effort, he conquered six further peoples, namely the Doleetae, Carni, Interphurini, Naresii, Glintidiones, and Taurisci, while the neighbouring Hippasini and Bessii surrendered of their own accord. The inhabitants of the islands of Melita and Corcyra, who practised piracy and had withstood him, were totally destroyed, partly killed and partly sold as slaves. Agrippa, who most probably commanded Octavian’s navy, sequestered the ships of the Liburni, who were also active as pirates. Of the Iapodes living in the Alps, the Moentini, Avendeatae, and Arupini surrendered to him, the latter after an initial flight from their stronghold to the woods. Twenty-two peoples and/or tribes are mentioned in total, all of them in one chapter, while in the twelve subsequent chapters, Appian dealt with the group of peoples who offered Octavian the greatest resistance. The relative unimportance of most of the peoples listed in the 16th and 17th chapters has often been emphasized, yet a relatively long catalogue of peoples in itself should not cause surprise, or a priori suggest the explanation that by listing a large number of names of conquered peoples, Octavian intentionally wished to deceive the Senate. Official documents undoubtedly contained relatively long lists of peoples and tribes, including their several subdivisions and administrative partitions, which is sufficiently illustrated by Pliny’s catalogues. Appian has preserved a narrative of these wars directly taken from the report of the protagonist himself; we have thus gained a glimpse of the nature of reports submitted to the Senate after a successful military campaign, and it may be assumed that Antony and other commanders submitted similar detailed lists of conquered tribes, as well as a more or less detailed description of the course of military actions. Mirković has even suggested that the peoples mentioned by Augustus should be regarded important rather than not, since only by listing the known peoples, possibly already conquered at an earlier date, could he have impressed the Senate. However, her suggestion can certainly not apply to the first group of peoples, some of which indeed seem to have been rather insignificant.

To what extent the peoples listed in Appian can be considered important or not, should be established on the basis of analyses. The last to deal systematically with the identification of these peoples were Dobriš, Mayer, Schmittenber and Bojanovskij, the former three mostly citing Tomaschek, Patsch, and Krahe for previous attempts at location and linguistic attribution.

28 - RE XV, 1 (1931), 896-900 no. 1 (Münzer).
29 - RE VIII A 1 (1955), 131-157 no. 261 (R. Hanslik); for the Illyrian wars, 141 ff.
30 - Suggested already by Schweighäuser in his 1785 edition of Appian, p. 556; cf. Fitz (n. 6). 27: Ti. Claudius Nero, Tiberius’ father, allegedly died in 33 BC (cf. RE III [1899], 2777-2778 no. 254 [Münzer]).
31 - RE VIII (1913), 224-225 no. 5 (Münzer).
32 - RE III A 2 (1929), 2195-2197 no. 33 ff. (Nagl). For all see also Fitz (n. 6), 27-28, with citations.
33 - Rodda (n. 9), 143.
34 - Mirković (n. 12), p. 120.
35 - Dobriš, Studie (n. 15), 182-218 (287-296); A. Mayer, Die Sprache der alten Illyrier I, Wien 1957, s.v.: Schmittenber (n. 5); I. Bojanovskij, Bosna i Hercegovina i antike dobaill. Novi Monografije, Académie des sciences et des arts de Bosnie-Herzegovine 66, Centre d’études balk. 6, Sarajevo 1988, passim.
36 - W. Tomaschek, Die vorslawische Topographie der Bosna, Herzegovina, Crna-gora und der angrenzenden Gebiete, Mitteilungen der k. und k. Geographischen Gesellschaft in Wien 23, 1880, 497-528; 545-567; Patsch (n. 11); H. Krahe, Die alten balkanfürische geogra-
be interesting to know whether some names were left out by Appian (and if so, how many), or whether he mentioned all the peoples noted by Octavian? If a historical description of these wars, as they were viewed by a relatively unbiased historian such as Dio, is compared with Appian’s narrative, it may be seen that Dio only mentioned the Salassi, Taurisci, Liburni, Iapodes, Pannonians, and Delmatae. Dio may have known and used Augustus’ Memoirs, but he also used a source, in which reminiscences slightly hostile to Octavian may be discerned, 37 perhaps versions of the Histories of Asinius Pollio or Crementus Cordus. Appian divided the peoples according to the resistance they had offered to the Roman army, and its efforts to subdue them. The exact order— if any— within the first two groups is not clear, but it is obviously not alphabetical and certainly not geographic, since the Carni, for instance, are noted next to the Docletae; neither is the order chronological, since the distance between the last two mentioned peoples is enormous. Within the three groups, the peoples may again be listed according to the degree of resistance they offered to Octavian, which would have been expected in an official text such as Octavian’s report to the Senate, reproduced in his Memoirs and copied by Appian. 38 However, in any case, the order according to which the names are noted can be of no help whatsoever in an attempt to locate those of the peoples which are not known from other sources.

Of eight peoples belonging to the first group, subdued with little effort, only the Oxyaei (= Ozuaci, Pliny, N. h. III 143) and the Taulantii (known from several Greek and Latin literary sources from Thucydides [I 24.1] to Pseudo-Syclax [26], Strabo [VII 7.8 C 326], and Ptolemey [III 12.4, ed. Nobbe]) may be identified beyond doubt, while for the Perthenetae, Bathitae, Cambaei, Cinambri, Meromeni, and Pyrrissaii, more or less plausible identifications have been suggested by various scholars, which must ultimately, however, all remain hypothetical. The Perthenetae may, or may not, be identified with the Partheni, mentioned by Pliny (N. h. III 143) as living in the Naronan conventus; on the one hand, the identification would seem to be supported by the manuscript variant of the name in Pliny, the Parthenavi, on the other, it is complicated by the fact that two supposedly different Partheni/Parthini are mentioned by Pliny, their other mention referring to a people settled in the hinterland of Lissus (III 145). In view of several repetitions in Pliny’s text, however, it is well possible to assume the existence of only one people. In either case, the identification with Appian’s Perthenetae cannot be excluded, 39 nor can it be proved.

The existence of hypothetical Banthitae, related to the toponym of Bantia, by lake Ohrid and identified with, elsewhere unattested, Appian’s Bathitae, was postulated by Mayer. 40 Likewise unattested are the Cambaei and Cinambri, 41 the latter possibly connected with the settlement of Cinna, twenty miles north of Scodra towards Narona. 42 Whether the Meromeni may be identified with the Melcumani mentioned by Pliny (III 143) as one of the minor tribes in the Narona conventus, and with the Melcomenii (Melcomenoi) noted by Ptolemy (II 16.8, ed. Nobbe) as being settled northeast of Salonae, should remain open to discussion. The enigmatic Pyrissaei should rather be considered as elsewhere not attested, especially since it is not even certain if their name should be regarded as corrupted and should rather be read as the Issaei, contaminated with another name starting in Pyr, this latter possibly identified with Pliny’s Pyraei (III 144). The proposed identifications all seem to seek the peoples of Appian’s first group in the Dalmatian part of Illyricum, although there is no reason that they should not be sought in the Pannonian part of the province or even altogether outside Illyricum, such as the Bessi of the second group and the Salassi of the third group.

However, despite so many uncertainties concerning Appian’s first group of peoples, which cannot but remain unsolved, one fact emerges beyond doubt: Octavian himself, or his generals, did indeed get involved with peoples settled beyond the demarcation line between the dominions of the two triumvirs at Scodra, having intervened in the territory assigned to Antony. This is proven by Appian’s mention of the Taulantii, who are located by all literary sources (listed above), except Pliny (N. h. III 144), explicitly in the hinterland of Dyrachium. According to the passage in Pliny’s lists, the Taulantii would have been settled somewhere in the hinterland of Lissus, since they are mentioned together with other peoples living between Epidaurum and Lissus. However, Pliny mentioned these peoples as living in “that area” (eo nomine erta), by which he may well have meant an area larger than the Naronian conventus. As has been convincingly argued by Mirković, 43 opinions postulating a migration of the Taulantii should be rejected, especially because Appian’s data are incorrectly called to their

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37 - See n. 8.
38 - Such an order seems to have been followed in listing the peoples and/or tribes in the Trauern Alpium, conquered during the Alpine campaigns of Drusus and Tiberius in 15 BC, see J. Salou, Zur Erklärung der Inschrift am Trauern Alpium (Pfin. n. b. 3, 136-137, CII V 7817). Živ. anslka 22, 1972, 135-144 (= Opera selecta, 1992, 288-297).
39 - Thus Mayer (n. 35), 258-259, and Mirković (n. 12), 120-122.
40 - Mayer (n. 35), 75, s.v. Bantia.
41 - Mayer (n. 35), 177, 190.
42 - Wilkes, CAH (n. 5), p. 577, sect, however, RE III (1899), 2562 (Patesch).
43 - Mirković (n. 12), 117-119.
support. If Appian mentioned them as having been attacked by Octavian’s army, this does not mean that they should be considered as having necessarily dwelt in that part of Illyricum which had been assigned to Octavian. On the contrary, it may be claimed that by having conquered the Taulantii, Octavian undoubtedly took possession of Dyrrhachium, one of the most important harbours in southern Adriatic and one of the starting points of via Egnatia. 44

The Hippasini and Bessi

Peoples of Appian’s second group, who offered more resistance to Octavian’s army, extended from the Carni in the north, the second mentioned within the group, most of whom were settled in the former Cisalpine Gaul, since 42 BC Italy proper, to the first mentioned Docleatae, a two well known peoples, located in the Narona conventus. The Taurisci, as has been noted above, inhabited large parts of present-day Slovenia, notably the valley of the Sova River and Lower Carniola extending in the direction of Siscia. After having listed the Taurisci, Appian added that the neighbouring Hippasini and Bessi, where Octavian had conquered all these peoples, surrendered to him of their own accord. The Hippasini are not documented in other sources, while the Bessi are a well known Thracian people who inhabited the upper valley of the Strymon River between the Haemus and Rhodope Mts. 46 There is no reason to believe, as did some scholars, that these peoples are two elsewhere undocumented Illyric peoples, the neighbours of the Taurisci. 47 The peoples bordering the Tauriscan regions are all very well known: the Carni, Norici, Iapodes, Colapiani, and Segestani, Boii, and, at the time of their greatest expansion, possibly the Scordisci (cf. Pliny, N. h. III 148: ... mons Claudius, cuius in fronte Scordiscis, in turgio Taurisci). The term “neighbouring peoples” refers to the second group of the so-called Illyric peoples in general, i.e. the Hippasini and Bessi should logically be sought outside Illyricum.

Thus the mention of the Bessi should no longer cause surprise. On the contrary, on a view of Octavian far-sightedly consolidating the regions along the borders of the province of Macedonia, it becomes understandable and strategically significant. Mirković has convincingly argued that the Hippasini may be identified with one of the Paenonian tribes who remained outside the borders of Macedonia, being settled between the southern Illyrian and Thracian peoples. The fact that they were cut from the majority of the Paenonian peoples would have favoured the appearance of the names of single tribes in the ancient sources, to avoid confusion with the Paen ones who were part of the province of Macedonia. The connection between the Hippasini and Paenones was first made by Mayer on the basis of Homer’s Ilias (XVII 346-350 and XI 577), where one ‘Ἀπασάειον ἤπειρον’, a Paenonian hero fighting on the side of the Trojans is mentioned. 48

Receiving the surrender of one of the Paenonian tribes – if the identification of the Hippasini is correct – and of the Bessi should not necessarily be regarded as Octavian’s violation of the pact of Brundisium, first of all since not all the details of the agreement between the triumvirs are known to us, and secondly, since the division between Octavian’s West and Antony’s East actually does not seem to have been rigorous. This is proven by Octavian’s diplomatic dealings with some of the eastern cities, such as Rhothus, Ephesus, Samos, and probably Aphrodisias. 49 In the case of the Bessi, and possibly the Hippasini, Octavian merely acted as the nearest representative of the highest Roman authority. It has even been claimed that Octavian may have been in contact with Antony’s enemy, Artavasdes of Armenia, unless this charge was merely Antony’s hostile propaganda (Dio, 49,41,5-6). 50

The Salassi, Iapodes, and Segestani

In chapter 17, mention is made of the peoples of the third group, who offered Octavian’s army the greatest resistance. These were the Salassi, Iapodes dwelling across the Alps, Segestani, Delmatae, the enigmatic Daessi, and Paenones (= Punnonians); heavy fighting against them was described by Appian in chapters 17-28. These, with the exception of the Daessi, also appear in Dio’s account of Octavian’s Illyrian campaigns. As has been noted above, Dio did not mention any tribes or peoples of the first group and only the Taurisci, Liburni, and Iapodes of the second, i.e. either the most notorious enemies of the Romans, such as the Taurisci and Iapodes, or the most well-known league of tribes inhabiting the opposite coast of the Adriatic, the Liburni, with whom the Italian peoples had cultivated contacts of long standing.

In chapter 17, Appian narrates the defeat of the Salassi by Antistius Vetus and M. Valerius Messalla Corvinus. 51 In chapters 18-21, the conquest of the

44 - Mirković (n. 12), 122.
45 - Mayer (n. 35), 171.
47 - Thus Schmitthenner (n. 5), 205-206, who is almost certainly wrong; his opinion, however, was accepted also by Šašel (n. 9).
48 - Mayer (n. 35), 49-50 and 156.
49 - Pelling (n. 12), p. 18, with citations.
50 - See Pelling (n. 12), p. 36.
Octavian's contacts with Cotiso provoked Antony's alliance with another of Burebista's successors, Dicomes (Plut., Ant. 63.7). By having captured Siscia and having garrisoned a strong military force of twenty-five cohorts (i.e. two and a half legions) in it, Octavian's generals must have been rightly convinced that any hostile attack, including a possible invasion of Antony's legions, from the direction of Macedonia via Italy could have been withstood.

Delmatae and southern Illyria

Octavian's attention had to be directed to the rebellious Delmatae, a dangerous enemy even closer to Italy. He diverted his main army to southern Liburnia where, in the boundary region between them and the Delmatae, the capture of Promona was the first major Roman military success. Octavian's army proceeded towards the south, capturing Sinodium and Setovia and destroying the Delmataean force, regaining the military standards lost under Gabinius. The last mentioned by Appian in the Dalmatian part of the wars were the Derbani, who surrendered without any fighting. If they are correctly connected with the toponym Andervâ/Anderba (present-day Nikšić in Montenegro), they should be located in southern Illyria. It seems plausible to assume that, after their capitulation in the final phase of these wars, various small communities listed mainly in Appian's first group of peoples, and partly in his second group, were subdued without offering much resistance, if any at all. The supreme commander after the siege of Setovia, when Octavian left for Italy, was Statilius Taurus, who remained in the province to conduct military actions necessary to finish the war (App., Illyr. 27.79; Dio 49.38). It was probably not coincidental that in 31 BC, he commanded Octavian's continental army at Actium (Vell. Pat. II 85.2; Plut., Ant. 65.3).

Because of the winning back of the lost military standards, the Dalmatian part of Octavian's Illyrian wars was - in terms of military prestige and glory - more important than the Iapodian-Pannonian part, which is also partly reflected in the official and non-official denomination of Octavian's wars. Although Appian and the Fasti Verusini correctly call it the Illyrian war, they are noted merely as bellum Delmaticum in Suetonius (Aug. 20); the triumph, awarded to Octavian by the Senate in 33 BC, is called de Doma [1] is in the Fasti Barberini (Ins. It. XIII I, p. 345) and Delmatae in Suetonius (Aug. 22; cf. also Servius, ad Verg., Aen. VIII 714; cf. Mon. Ancyr. 29.1).

identifies them with the Deuri, the Derrioi of Ptolemy, and locates them around Bogojino in the upper valley of Virbas. This identification is almost certainly incorrect, since there is no evidence that Octavian's army would have advanced at all into the interior of present-day Bosnia.
The surrender of the Bessi should also be chronologically assigned towards the end of the Delmatian phase of the wars, as well as the subjugation of the Taulantii, which may have brought Dyrrhachium under Octavian’s control. Actually, none of the three southern Illyrian harbours is mentioned in the sources; perhaps it would not have been easy for Octavian to justify military actions within the borders of Antony’s dominion, and so he may have preferred to pass over these facts in silence. It may not have been difficult to win over Apollonia which had supported Caesar during the war against Pompey, and where he and Agrippa had stayed for half a year before Caesar’s death, perfecting both their military and their higher education (Vell. Pat. II 59.4; App., Bell. civ. III 9.30-32; Suet., Aug. 8.4, cf. 94.17; see also Dio 45.3.1; Plut., Brutus 22.2).\(^{55}\) However, the details are not known to us; it can merely be added that the political situation and the balance of power between the triumvirs in 33 BC were definitely different from what they had been at the time of the pact at Brundisium in 40 BC. It may well be supposed that by 33 BC, the conflict with Antony was imminent and the control of southern Illyria, including three harbours opposite Brundisium, was not irrelevant.